Matthew Kroenig: Hi, Emma! Greetings from Lake Tahoe! I am here for a conference. (For our European readers, it is kind of like America’s Lake Como—albeit with a bit less Renaissance architecture and fine Italian dining—so I am not suffering). How are you?

Emma Ashford: Oh, lovely. Well, I’m back in Washington. The kids are in camp, and it’s hot and swampy. Summer is definitely here.

It’s been a busy news week, too, with some subjects well off our usual U.S. foreign-policy beat. Though I suppose the surprise plea deal U.S. prosecutors reached with Julian Assange, the notorious WikiLeaks founder, is certainly a U.S. national security story.

MK: Yes, many are celebrating his release and see him as a defender of radical government transparency. I am not a lawyer, but I would have been happy to see him locked behind bars for the rest of his life.

In 2010, he conspired with Chelsea Manning, a U.S. intelligence analyst, to publish thousands of pages of classified documents on the U.S. and allied war in Afghanistan. That is not journalism. It is irresponsible. Imagine if a “journalist” had published plans for the D-Day invasion before it was carried out?

Serious journalists try to balance the public’s right to know with national security concerns.

EA: Two things were true at the same time in this case: First, Assange—in addition to apparently being an unpleasant houseguest—was suspected of ties to Russian intelligence and actively published documents that undermined U.S. security. That he got away with only five years in Britain’s Belmarsh Prison seems like a pretty minor punishment. Second, however, as Jameel Jaffer, a former deputy director at the American Civil Liberties Union, put it, “the logic of the deal is that Assange will have served five years in prison for activities that journalists engage in every day, and that we absolutely need them to engage in.”

Assange’s methods and approach were similar to those used by mainstream journalists. Now, I think most good journalists certainly put more effort into protecting lives and thinking through the implications of what they publish. But even if Assange got what he deserved, the case is still a worrying precedent for press freedom.

MK: I disagree that these are the same methods used by mainstream journalists. It was not part of some kind of well-researched investigative journalism into a particular issue. He just dumped a bunch of classified documents online, endangering the lives of American and allied forces, their intelligence sources and supporters in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the broader war efforts.

Moreover, when serious national security journalists in the United States consider publishing sensitive or classified information, they usually notify the U.S. government, and they will often hold stories if the government warns that there would be serious national security ramifications.

EA: Right. Although there are occasions when journalists publish even against the advice or consent of the U.S. government. The Pentagon Papers, for example, which exposed the ruinous costs of the Vietnam War and the fact that the White House was lying to Americans, ended up being litigated in the courts—which decided in favor of the New York Times and the Washington Post. The press in a democracy performs a vital role in keeping the public aware of what is being done in their name.

At the same time, if I remember correctly, Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the documents, only leaked specific sections and redacted them himself for irrelevant and dangerous information before giving them to journalists.

The bottom line, I think, is that the relationship between national security and the press is complex. Who counts as a journalist? Assange certainly didn’t have America’s best interests at heart, but an unscrupulous administration could easily use this precedent for ill.

MK: I am worried about the precedent—but in the other direction. If you conspire with America’s enemies to damage U.S. national security by leaking a bunch of classified information with no real journalistic purpose, then you shouldn’t be going home free.

But there is a lot of other stuff going on in the world this week. Are you following the unrest in Kenya? The government is attempting to make economic reforms, including cutting subsidies and raising taxes, which have resulted in massive and sometimes violent anti-government protests.

In addition to the implications for Kenya, the timing is somewhat unfortunate for the United States. U.S. President Joe Biden just hosted Kenyan President William Ruto for a state dinner at the White House last month, and just this week, he officially designated Kenya a major non-NATO ally.

What is your take?

EA: It feels a bit like a blast from the past: An African state is struggling to reform its economy under heavy debt-service obligations, and the reforms proposed by the International Monetary Fund have sparked protests. That could have been written at any time in the 1990s or 2000s. A more modern wrinkle to the story, however, is that Ruto not only appears to have authorized police to open fire on protesters—killing at least 22—but is describing them as “treasonous,” and “criminals” in an effort to delegitimize them. Kenyan police have arrested a number of citizens without charges, and the crackdown appears highly undemocratic.

As you say, not a good look for the Biden administration’s embrace of the Kenyan government. Particularly given that the improving relationship between Washington and Nairobi is driven in part by Ruto’s willingness to deploy Kenyan troops to Haiti—at Washington’s request—to quell gang violence in that country.

MK: Yes. Kenya is rated partly free by Freedom House and is generally seen as an example of good government and a stable Western partner in East Africa. Washington and Nairobi coordinate closely on counterterrorism in the region, for example. It has experienced bouts of violence in the past, including surrounding the 2007 and 2017 presidential elections, but it has been mostly stable since then.

Ruto promised to withdraw the proposed tax bill on Wednesday, but the unrest continued with what was billed as a “million-person march” on Thursday. I hope this violence is contained, and the country can return to politics as normal.

EA: It does raise questions about the whole “major non-NATO ally” category. U.S. involvement in Africa more generally in recent years has focused far too much on counterterrorism and not enough on economic or diplomatic engagement. U.S. forces are now having to leave bases in Niger and elsewhere as governments in the region turn against Washington. And now, it seems the White House has been openly celebrating a government that follows a U.S. state visit with an apparent decision to shoot protesters. It’s not a good look and just reinforces my opinion that the United States needs a wholesale rethink of its policy toward the African continent.

Let’s turn back to Eurasia for a moment. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have enjoyed his state visit to North Korea. He received a rapturous—though perhaps not entirely spontaneous—reception from crowds in Pyongyang, and he and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un spent time testing out cars together. Other than the ridiculous visuals, do you think there was much substance to this visit?

MK: Yes, I do think there is substance that should be worrying to us all. You are right, the visuals were silly, but the two dictators also agreed to a new, landmark defense pact with promises to assist each other militarily in the event of conflict. This is just more evidence that this new axis of authoritarian regimes (China, Russia, and North Korea) is growing increasingly close. Indeed, formal cooperation among these powers is even greater than that among the Axis powers on the eve of World War II, and we all know how much damage they caused.

Now, to be sure, this new alliance will not be as deep or effective as, say, NATO. And a quick look at history shows that Russia goes to war against its allies almost as often as it fights alongside them (Adolf Hitler, Mao Zedong, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are among the “allies” Russia has fought over the past century), so I do have my doubts about whether these dictators will come to each other’s aid if it does not suit their narrow self-interest at the time.

Still, I think the desire to cooperate more closely on military matters is significant.

EA: It seems to me to show the opposite! Yes, Moscow and Pyongyang are trying to build closer ties, and there are things that both might benefit from, such as the arms trade. But doesn’t that suggest that China isn’t as involved? After all, if Russia has to go to North Korea to procure ammunition for its war in Ukraine, it seems to suggest that China is unwilling to provide it. China has thus far shied away from providing actual arms and ammunition, fearing a backlash from the West if it does so.

And various stories have been coming out of Beijing in the last week around this summit that suggest that Chinese leaders are actually quite wary of growing Russia-North Korea ties, which they believe might increase both nations’ independence. Apparently, Beijing was displeased by the signing of the mutual defense pact, maybe out of fear that it will reduce Chinese influence over Pyongyang going forward.

So, yes, certainly, the two countries are getting closer, but I’m still not sure it implies coherence or agreement among a Russia-China-North Korea axis. Still lots of disagreements there.

MK: There are remaining disagreements to be sure, but to me, it seems as if the general trend line is toward greater military cooperation. We will have to see how it plays out—and I hope that it stops short of World War III.

In the meantime, there are major elections in the world before our next column, with Iran, France, and the United Kingdom all choosing new elected officials in the next 10 days or so—and the ones in the U.K. and especially France actually matter.

What are you watching for in your homeland and beyond?

EA: If I’m perfectly honest, I enjoy the gaffes. Rishi Sunak standing in the rain trying to announce an election, Count Binface standing on the hustings next to the prime minister, and of course, my personal favorite: watching the Scottish National Party get completely gubbed.

MK: And the Twitter menswear guy pointing out that Sunak’s pants are ridiculously tight. But go on.

EA: Ha, that one was funny. But there are a lot of serious things to watch as well, I suppose. It seems that Labour is set to win big in Britain; the remaining question is how big and whether there will be a significant Conservative opposition in Parliament or not. Some polls show Nigel Farage’s Reform party outpolling the Tories and the Liberal Democrats winning more seats and becoming the official opposition. The biggest scandal in the U.K. at the moment has to do with whether candidates are allowed to place bets on themselves and the timing of the election, which several Tories have been accused of doing.

France is more concerning. French President Emmanuel Macron may have made a significant mistake calling a snap election. Though the momentum of the National Rally (Marine Le Pen’s far-right party formerly known as the National Front) seems to have slowed a bit, it’s still plausible that it could come away with a majority in Parliament and perhaps even form a government. If it doesn’t win so big, then Macron’s party combined with the left may be able to overtake it. But either way, it’s going to be a nail-biter of a result and could set up Le Pen for a run at the French presidency in the next few years.

MK: Yes. As we discussed last time, Macron seems to have been betting that while French voters supported the National Rally in the European Parliament elections, they would balk at investing them with real responsibility in the French government. It now seems that rash gamble was mistaken, with the National Rally holding a sizable lead in the polls. Or perhaps, he wants Le Pen’s party to win and fail at governing to weaken it before the 2027 presidential election.

Moreover, this vote could also have implications for French foreign policy, as a good article in Foreign Policy recently pointed out. It will be much harder for Macron to carry out his foreign-policy vision if he is tied down with domestic matters, including potential cohabitation with a right-wing government and prime minister.

The election in Iran, of course, matters much less, as Saeid Jafari explained in Foreign Policy this week. Iran is an autocracy. The supreme leader maintains ultimate control over Iran’s foreign and defense policy. The president is elected from a narrow, preapproved group; 74 candidates were disqualified from running this time.

EA: Iran is a quasi-autocracy. It’s certainly not a democracy, but if we’re going to be political scientists about this, we’d probably have to agree that it falls somewhere between a Saudi-style dictatorship and a Western democracy. These elections are an interesting case in point. You’re right that most candidates were excluded. But six candidates engaged in debates and campaigning, four of whom are still in the race. The death of President Ebrahim Raisi and others in a helicopter crash in May has opened the door to an unexpected level of contestation for future top jobs, even among the narrow slice of the ruling elite permitted to run.

It’s certainly not going to be as meaningful as elections in France, Britain, or elsewhere, but we shouldn’t reduce the Iranian election to nothing either. It will shape Iranian policy going forward.

MK: I disagree. Iran is an autocracy, and these elections are mostly meaningless. The president has some responsibility over how strictly to enforce religious rules on things such as women dancing, but otherwise he has no real responsibility. So, as Jafari argues, even when the so-called reformists win, they can’t do much.

And if we are going to be political scientists, let’s look at the data. Freedom House scores Iran 11/100 on its freedom scale. Maybe one day Iran can strive to be as free as Putin’s Russia, which Freedom House scores a mighty 13!

EA: So it ranks somewhere between U.S. allies Saudi Arabia (8/100), Egypt (18/100), and the United Arab Emirates (18/100)? Look, there are so many methodological problems with Freedom House scores that I don’t know where to start.

But perhaps we can debate democracy rankings some other day? I have some meetings to get to, and the Putin-Kim summit provided me with the perfect soundtrack to listen to en route.