A pair of undersea data cables in the Baltic Sea mysteriously stopped working in the last two days, and the first reaction from Germany and Finland, two NATO members, was essentially, “What have the Russians done now?” followed by, sotto voce, “Is there a chance this was an accident?”

The two cables—one between Sweden and Lithuania, and another from Finland to Germany—suddenly went down Sunday and Monday. It’s not the first time data cables in or near the Baltic have been tampered with, nor pipelines punctured. But that very background noise of Russian interference and malfeasance in the Baltic in recent years has muddied the true signals of what is going on. As it is, every bad thing that happens up north is laid at Moscow’s door, especially when things are getting heated otherwise. 

Yes, a couple of Finnish nuclear power reactors also went mysteriously offline at the same time the cables were cut. Yes, the Russians have been on a sabotage rampage throughout Europe. Sure, the Russians have made special trouble in the Baltics since Sweden and Finland joined NATO. True, the Biden administration has belatedly unleashed Ukraine to strike at Russian targets somewhat behind the actual Russian front line, crossing the latest of the Kremlin’s effable boundaries and sparking the promise of reprisals.

But that doesn’t necessarily mean that the Russian survey/spy ships that have spent years darting about the Baltic were behind the sudden outage on the line between Sweden and Lithuania or the one between Finland and Germany. One such ship was as far away as Irish Sea just days ago. 

Forensics on the severed cable won’t be possible until it is dragged up for repairs, which could take weeks. Dragging anchors, trawling, and other accidents actually cause the majority of subsea cable incidents.

“There is a risk of seeing everything one way in a hall of mirrors,” said Charly Salonius-Pasternak, a researcher with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. “It’s possible that a ship that wasn’t used to operating in the Baltic” could have caused an accident, he said, citing Russia’s shadow fleet of tankers that often eschew local pilots with the same ease they jettison rules and regulations. “The people who would usually be [sailing] here aren’t, and these guys can make mistakes.” 

Salonius-Pasternak said that policymakers and intelligence professionals would be looking at coincidences, “and when they see five or six things all pointing in the same direction, then they’ll draw conclusions publicly.”

Top German officials for once got off the fence. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius called the incident “sabotage” and said that he didn’t believe any ship’s anchor did that.

The problem with attribution when it comes to undersea sabotage, if that’s what it is, is much like that of cyber attribution, if not trickier. Cables go down for lots of reasons; cables get cut in a lot of ways. Pipelines, too, though less so. Fingerprints are rare. Nobody is even entirely clear yet on who blew up the Nord Stream gas pipeline between Russia and Germany two years ago, though some reports suggested a Ukrainian operation. 

People in the subsea cable business caution that accidental damage in this case is perfectly plausible. Chinese sand trawlers, not Chinese planning, might have clumsily damaged Taiwanese undersea cables a while back; Yemen’s Houthis, who vaguely warned about cutting subsea cables, only did so in the end because the ship they crippled with drones ended up dragging its anchor over a bunch of cables. 

But it is the wider context that rightly worries NATO’s members. Russia has for years sought to reassert its traditional influence in the Baltic Sea, lost a first time when the Baltic republics bolted from the Soviet Union in 1991 and a second time when, thanks to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic became a true “NATO lake.”

For years, Russia has used survey ships to keep a close eye on Western subsea infrastructure in the region, from data cables to natural gas pipelines and offshore wind farms. More recently, it has flooded the narrow sea with irregular oil tankers to skirt sanctions, raising additional concerns about navigation and the safety of the environment. NATO now has a subsea infrastructure unit on the case. Smaller countries are taking steps to protect their underwater infrastructure. 

And Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, as well as possible destabilizing actions elsewhere, coupled with the imminent arrival of a second Trump administration in the United States, prompted several European and NATO members on Tuesday to pledge a more robust European defense against Russia’s “restless revisionism.” 

The leaders of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and Spain pointedly noted in their joint statement that “Moscow’s escalating hybrid activities against NATO and EU countries are also unprecedented in their variety and scale, creating significant security risks.”

When it comes to protecting the internet and data cables that are the underpinnings of modern societies, industry experts often note the built-in redundancy that comes from having so many cables essentially covering the same route: There’s more capacity to fill any unexpected shortfalls or interruptions. Ukraine belatedly learned something similar as it sought decentralized power-generation solutions after Russia destroyed half its big power plants. 

“One of the best ways to protect critical infrastructure like this is through redundancy, having lots of the same things, in this case many data cables. Redundancy creates resilience if it’s done well,” Salonius-Pasternak said. The problem is that it runs counter to the just-in-time efficiency-driven managerial mindset that dominates so much that is adjacent to national security, down to and including sharp-end activities such as U.S. naval logistics.

“This is one of the reminders that, while it might seem economically unfeasible at times, it is worth it to states to ensure that there are resilient networks, not just communications, but energy, heat, and so on,” Salonius-Pasternak said.