[[{“value”:”
Cash to buy U.S. weapons for Ukraine would also help balance trade.
By Bart M. J. Szewczyk, a nonresident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund and an adjunct professor at Sciences Po.
A deep sense of powerlessness and outright panic has beset Europe. Leaders seem shell-shocked by the speed of Washington’s pivot to Russia, the relentless steps toward a trans-Atlantic divorce, and U.S. President Donald Trump’s comprehensive adoption of the Kremlin’s views on Ukraine and much else. Should the United States continue on this path, it will have existential consequences not only for Ukraine, but also for Europe itself—including an increasingly likely next war that it will have to fight without help from the United States. Trump’s public blow-up with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky last Friday and the U.S. decision to halt weapons shipments to Ukraine have reinforced fears that the struggle against Russia may already be lost.
Thus far, Europe has resorted to what it knows best: summitry and talk. An emergency meeting of European leaders in Paris right after the discordant Munich Security Conference was followed with visits to Washington by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron and another emergency summit in London. A special European Council meeting is planned for this week, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has called for an EU-U.S. summit. Despite all this summitry, a strategy has yet to emerge.
A deep sense of powerlessness and outright panic has beset Europe. Leaders seem shell-shocked by the speed of Washington’s pivot to Russia, the relentless steps toward a trans-Atlantic divorce, and U.S. President Donald Trump’s comprehensive adoption of the Kremlin’s views on Ukraine and much else. Should the United States continue on this path, it will have existential consequences not only for Ukraine, but also for Europe itself—including an increasingly likely next war that it will have to fight without help from the United States. Trump’s public blow-up with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky last Friday and the U.S. decision to halt weapons shipments to Ukraine have reinforced fears that the struggle against Russia may already be lost.
Thus far, Europe has resorted to what it knows best: summitry and talk. An emergency meeting of European leaders in Paris right after the discordant Munich Security Conference was followed with visits to Washington by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron and another emergency summit in London. A special European Council meeting is planned for this week, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has called for an EU-U.S. summit. Despite all this summitry, a strategy has yet to emerge.
Yet Europe still has real sources of leverage that it can use before Washington moves farther down its path. What matters now is what Europe puts on the table as part of the effort to forge and sustain a just peace in Ukraine.
Trump loves deals, and Europe is rich. Europe should immediately offer to spend at least $200 billion to buy U.S.-made weapons for Ukraine over the next four years. This kills two birds with one stone: bolster Ukrainian and European security and immediately eliminate much of the United States’ trade deficit with the European Union. Unlike the minerals agreement the Trump administration seeks with Ukraine, a European arms deal would be cash for the United States to bank now.
The EU can weather a large-scale trade conflict with the United States, but it will be many years before it can guarantee Ukraine’s and its own security without U.S. weapons. As Zelensky said in Washington, the most important question for Ukraine is: “Will we be able to buy weapons directly from the U.S.” if military aid stays stopped? All other measures currently under discussion, including the deployment of British and French peacekeeping troops to Ukraine, are premised on the continued flow of U.S. weapons. U.S. equipment remains indispensable to turning Ukraine into a “steel porcupine that is indigestible for potential invaders,” as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said.
According to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker, Washington has allocated roughly half—approximately $69 billion—of all Western military aid since January 2022. (The U.S. number is largely an accounting figure, since much of the aid consists of old weapons out of storage.) If the war continues or Russia attacks again after a temporary cease-fire, a halt of U.S. supplies could be fatal for Ukraine. Europe cannot replace these supplies from its own production any time soon, particularly high-end weaponry such as the Patriot missile defense system and long-range precision rockets. Europe has spectacularly failed to rev up its defense industry since Russia invaded three years ago. The same holds for Europe’s own security, where it would take many years to develop and replace critical U.S. components of European defense, including intelligence, missile defense, and the nuclear security umbrella. Ensuring a steady supply of U.S. military supplies to both Ukraine and Europe will thus remain crucial in the coming years.
Europe is a wealthy continent with deep pockets. If one includes the aid that has been pledged to Ukraine for the coming years, the EU and its member states account for two-thirds of all military and non-military aid—€247.4 billion compared to Washington’s €119 billion. A coalition of willing EU members plus Britain and Norway could pick up the additional tab of $200 billion—or $50 billion per year—for U.S. weapons to Ukraine for the foreseeable future. Regardless of any potential peace negotiations or cease-fire agreements, Ukraine will need an enduring supply of weapons.
A $200 billion purchase of U.S. weapons could help ensure Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself against Russian aggression while Europe’s own domestic production expands. Using common debt issued by the EU or, if Hungary or other members block EU action, by a coalition of the willing would allow Europe to leverage its collective financial power and to act swiftly and decisively. It also underscores the collective responsibility the EU holds in safeguarding Ukrainian and European security without overburdening individual member states.
The purchase would not only allow Ukraine to establish a sustainable defense strategy for the coming years, but it would also send a powerful message to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Ukraine’s European allies will not back down from his aggression. It could even help tip the scales in U.S.-Russia negotiations, pressuring Putin to negotiate from a position of vulnerability rather than strength.
This could be an easy political win for Trump. On top of that, a European purchase of this size spread over four years would go a long way toward rebalancing trans-Atlantic trade. The $50 billion per year would also take a large chunk out of the U.S. goods and services trade deficit with the EU, which was around $52 billion in 2023, according to EU data.
By meeting two of Trump’s objectives—get Europe to support Ukraine and reduce the U.S. deficit—$200 billion may be the price of entry to any prospect of future trans-Atlantic cooperation.
Of course, Washington will not be the only obstacle to overcome. Macron has consistently opposed European plans to buy U.S. weapons, insisting that EU funds go to EU producers—many of which are French. But based on news coming out of the recent emergency summit in Paris, France appeared to be on its own in its opposition to purchasing U.S. weapons; today, most EU governments, including Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, and the Baltic states, would likely support a potential deal. Poland and the Baltic states already issued a joint letter advocating that European funds be used to purchase U.S. weapons for Ukraine. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, in paticular, has long argued for additional purchases of U.S. weapons for Ukraine as part of a wider trans-Atlantic bargain. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte also said that Europe is ready to pay for U.S. weapons to Ukraine.
However, deploying checkbook diplomacy to purchase trans-Atlantic cooperation is only one of the ways Europe needs to adapt to a world in which Washington no longer sees an advantage in having allies. The other way is to create its own leverage and pressure.
For instance, consider the well-established norm that Europe and the United States are partners of first resort. As Trump breaks this norm with regards to Russia and Ukraine, Europe may feel compelled to be less cooperative with the United States on other core issues, such as China. European policies toward Beijing began to align with Washington’s during Joe Biden’s presidency, partly out of European self-interest in de-risking from overdependence on China. But to a great extent, Europe also responded to U.S. persuasion and the desire to avoid a rift.
If the Trump team strikes too hard a bargain now, Brussels might reopen negotiations on an EU-China investment agreement, which were discontinued at the request of the Biden administration. It could also launch a new EU-China trade and technology council, an economic cooperation format it already has with the United States and India.
Of course, all these points are moot if Trump prefers a deal with Russia over one with Europe, with the likely consequence that Ukraine falls and NATO implodes. France and Germany would then start to hedge and likely accommodate Russian demands, whether under their current governments or future right-wing ones, brought to power with the help of Russian and U.S. election interference. In this grim future, the United States would face a resurgent Russia backed by China, Iran, and North Korea. It would be a recipe for how to lose friends and squander power.
The Trump administration’s decisions on Ukraine will determine which sort of future comes to pass, but it is now up to Europe to do all it can to make continued support more attractive to Washington.
This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration. Follow along here.
Bart M. J. Szewczyk is a nonresident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, an adjunct professor at Sciences Po, a former member of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, a former advisor on refugee policy to the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and the author of Europe’s Grand Strategy: Navigating a New World Order. X: @bartszewczyk
The post Europe Should Make a $200 Billion Deal With Trump appeared first on Energy News Beat.
“}]]